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Supporting the creation of credit markets to foster investment is a key role of
the state in promoting economic development. Policies aimed at extending
and improving property rights so that assets can be pledged as collateral
for loans are an important aspect of this. This has become a cause cØlŁbre
of Hernando de Soto who has argued that this is a central mechanism for
improving the lives of the poor.1 His view is stated succinctly in the following
quote:
￿What the poor lack is easy access to the property mecha-
nisms that could legally ￿x the economic potential of their as-
sets so that they could be used to produce, secure, or guarantee
greater value in the expanded market...Just as a lake needs hy-
droelectric plant to produce usable energy, assets need a formal
property system to produce signi￿cant surplus value.￿(de Soto,
2001).
This idea has captured the imagination of policy makers and has been taken
up all over the world. We refer to the idea that better access to collateral
increases credit availability as the de Soto e⁄ect.2
Signi￿cant disparities remain across countries in the extent to which prop-
erty can be registered and hence used as collateral. A feel for this can be
found by looking at data from the World Bank doing business project which
has collected a three indicators on the ease with which property can be regis-
tered on a consistent basis for 93 countries. We use the number of procedures
(between 1 and 16) which are needed in order to register property.3 Figure
1See, for example, de Soto (2000, 2001).
2It is arguable that this should really be called the Bauer-de Soto e⁄ect since this link
was also spotted by Peter Bauer in his perceptive account of West African trade wherein
he argues that:
￿Both in Nigeria and in the Gold Coast family and tribal rights in rural
land is unsatisfactory for loans. This obstructs the ￿ ow and application of
capital to certain uses of high return, which retards the growth of income
and hence accumulation.￿(Bauer, 1954 p. 9).
3The data for this and other indicators including the time
to register and the cost of registering property are available at:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/RegisteringProperty.aspx
21 shows that, in line with de Soto￿ s claim, countries where fewer procedures
are required have higher credit to GDP ratios.
But reduced form relationships like the regression line in Figure 1 say
little about the mechanism at work. While de Soto￿ s ideas have immense
intuitive appeal, there have been few e⁄orts to examine the economic logic
of the de Soto e⁄ect in detail.
There is an obvious aspect of the de Soto e⁄ect which presumably most
advocates have in mind. This is that enhancing collateral potential will lead
to either bigger loans and/or lower interest rates. However, there is more
to it than this. In some of his writings, it is clear that de Soto also has in
mind that reforms that secure property rights will enhance competition in
the credit markets and change the nature of interaction between formal and
informal sectors. To study this clearly requires a more sophisticated model.
This paper lays out a simple, but tractable, framework that allows us
to identify a number of facets of the de Soto e⁄ect. Some of these require
considering how the market equilibrium responds while others are visible
without these consequences being taken into consideration. We will show
that in the logic of the de Soto e⁄ect a crucial role is played by assumptions
about how competitively the credit market operates and hence how the gains
from improving property rights are allocated between lenders and borrowers.
Another feature of Figure 1 is how the ability to register property re-
mains weak in many countries in spite of the well-known arguments for the
importance of assets as collateral. This could, of course, re￿ ect sheer in-
competence of some states which is certainly plausible. However, there is a
more interesting possibility ￿that it may not actually be optimal to improve
property registration under all conditions.
We characterize under what conditions it is optimal to undertake property
rights reform. We show that this rests on a particular kind of second-best
reasoning related to the absence of competition in the credit market. In
the presence of extreme poverty and little competition, increasing property
rights registration can actually lead only to greater exploitation in the credit
market because lenders can foreclose on defaulting borrowers more easily,
without any e¢ ciency gains. If the state is unwilling to act to reduce such
market power, the validity of the argument that property registration is a
win-win for borrowers and lenders is thus called into question.
Our paper is related to the large literature on credit markets in devel-
oping countries. The functioning of capital markets is now appreciated to
be a key determinant of the development process (see Banerjee, 2004, and
3Mookherjee, Ghosh and Ray, 2000 for reviews). Within this, the issue of
how legal systems support trade in credit, labour, and land markets is a
major topic. For example, Kranton and Swamy (1999) show how the intro-
duction of civil courts in colonial India increased competition among lenders
while undermining long-term relationships among borrowers and lenders by
making it easier for borrowers to switch lenders. Genicot (2002) shows how
banning bonded labour generates greater competition between landlords and
moneylenders thereby improving the welfare of poor farmers.
Our work is also related to the macro-economic literature which stud-
ies how aspects of legal systems a⁄ect the development of ￿nancial markets.
One distinctive view is the legal origins approach associated with La Porta et
al (1998). They argue that whether a country has a civil or common law tra-
dition is strongly correlated with the form and extent of subsequent ￿nancial
development with common law countries having more developed ￿nancial sys-
tems. In similar vein, Djankov et al. (2007) ￿nd that improvements in rights
which a⁄ect the ability of borrowers to use collateral are strongly positively
correlated with credit market development in a cross-section of countries.
The micro-economic literature on property rights has focused to a sig-
ni￿cant degree on empirically estimating the e⁄ects of titling programs on
farm productivity and other household allocation decisions.4 This literature
o⁄ers some support to the idea that strengthening land titles improves pro-
ductivity by reducing insecurity, and (to a more limited extent) by improving
credit market access.5 A number of papers have empirically explored the
e⁄ect that collateral improvement has on credit contracts (see, for example,
Liberti and Mian, 2009).
Our paper is also closely related to the emerging literature that looks
at the political economy of institutional reform. For example, Pagano and
Volpin (2005), Caselli and Gennaioli (2008), and Perotti and Volpin (2007)
study the political economy of improvements in investor protection. Both
emphasize the possibility that weak legal systems can limit competition and
hence may lead those who earn rents to block reforms. Biais and Mariotti
(2008) study the choice between soft and hard bankruptcy rules and focus on
the general equilibrium interactions between the credit and labour market.
4Contributions include Besley (2005), Field (2005, 2007), Field and Torero (2006),
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2005), Goldstein and Udry (2008), Hornbeck (2008), and John-
son, McMillan, and Woodru⁄ (2002).
5 This is part of a wider literature on the importance of property rights discussed in
Besley and Ghatak (2009).
4The focus on rent protection as a source of underdevelopment supports the
general thrust of arguments in Rajan (2007). Related also is the study
of debt bondage by von-Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2008) who argue
that the elimination of debt bondage (something which can improve the
enforcement of contracts) can be explained by the general equilibrium e⁄ects
on the allocation of rents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
introduces our core model of credit market contracting. In section three,
we use this to study second-best e¢ cient credit contracts. This section
also characterizes the market equilibrium where lenders compete to serve
borrowers. Section four extends the model to include an informal sector
that uses ￿social collateral￿ . This allows us to explore when reforms increase
market depth. Section ￿ve uses the model to study policy issues. It looks at
optimal policy towards creating collateral and implications of the framework
for the political economy of reform. Section six o⁄ers some concluding
comments.
2 The Model
The model studies contracting between borrowers and lenders. We use a
variant of a fairly standard agency model (see Innes, 1990) that is frequently
used to analyze contractual issues in development.6 The borrower￿ s e⁄ort is
subject to moral hazard and in addition, he has limited pledgeable wealth
creating a limited liability problem. Our focus here is on the way that con-
tract enforcement is limited due to imperfections in property rights protection
which reduce the collateralizability of wealth.
Borrowers There are n identical potential borrower-entrepreneurs whose
projects can be enhanced by access to working capital provided by lenders.
Each borrower is assumed to be endowed with the same level of illiquid wealth
w (e.g., a house or a piece of land).
We assume that property rights are poorly de￿ned which a⁄ects the bor-
rowers￿ability to pledge his wealth as collateral. We introduce a parameter
￿ that captures this. Speci￿cally, we assume that if a borrower has wealth
w then its collateral value is only (1 ￿ ￿)w: So ￿ = 0 corresponds to perfect
6See, for example, Mookherjee and Ray (2002), and Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak
(2002).
5property rights whereas ￿ = 1 corresponds to the case where property rights
are completely absent. We will refer to (1 ￿ ￿)w as a borrower￿ s e⁄ective
wealth.
Each borrower supplies e⁄ort e 2 [0;e] and uses working capital x 2 [0;x]
to produce an output. Output is stochastic and takes the value q(x) with
probability p(e) and 0 with probability 1 ￿ p(e): The marginal cost of e⁄ort
is one and the marginal cost of x is ￿: Expected ￿surplus￿is therefore:
p(e)q(x) ￿ e ￿ ￿x:
Throughout the analysis we make the following regularity assumption which
ensures a well-behaved maximization problem with interior solutions.
Assumption 1 The following conditions hold for the functions p(e) and
q(x):
(i) Both p(e) and q(x) are twice continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increas-
ing and strictly concave for all e 2 [0;e];x 2 [0;x]:
(ii) p(0) ￿ 0; p(e) < 1; q(0) = 0; and q(x) ￿ q where q is a ￿nite positive
real number.
(iii) The Inada endpoint condition holds for both p(e) and q(x) as e ! 0
and x ! 0.
(iv) p(e)q(x) is strictly concave for all e 2 [0;e];x 2 [0;x].
These assumptions are all fairly standard. They hold, for example, if p(e) =
e￿ and q(x) = x￿ where e < 1; x < 1;￿ 2 (0;1), ￿ 2 (0;1); and ￿ + ￿ < 1:
Lenders We assume that there are two lenders (j = 1;2) who borrow funds
from depositors or in wholesale markets to fund their lending. We assume
that the more e¢ cient lender has marginal cost of funds ￿ while the less
e¢ cient lender has marginal cost ￿ ￿ with ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. We assume that each lender
has unlimited capacity to supply the market.7
In the case where ￿ ￿ = ￿, these market lenders are equally e¢ cient and
we are e⁄ectively in the case of Bertrand competition with identical costs.
7The assumption of two lenders is without loss of generality given these assumptions
by applying the standard logic of Bertrand-competition.
6To the extent that ￿ ￿ is greater than ￿ the low cost lender may be able to
earn a rent relative to the outside option of borrowers of borrowing from
the less e¢ cient lender. Thus ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ will e⁄ectively be a measure of market
competitiveness.
We can interpret this set up as one where lenders are ￿nancial intermedi-
aries which borrow money from risk neutral depositors whose discount factor
is ￿. Financial intermediary j repays depositors with probability ￿j. This
could re￿ ect intrinsic trustworthiness or the state of the intermediary￿ s bal-




is intermediary j￿ s
cost of funds which is lower for more trustworthy intermediaries. Naturally,
1=￿ sets a natural lower bound for the marginal cost of capital.
3 Contracting
We assume e is not contractible. This would not be a problem if a borrower
had su¢ cient wealth to act as a bond against non-repayment. However, limits
on the amount of wealth on this will be an important friction preventing the
￿rst-best outcome being realized. Even if the borrower￿ s liquid wealth is
su¢ cient for this purpose, poorly de￿ned property rights, as argued by de
Soto (2001) may place a further limit.
A credit contract is a triple fr;c;xg where r is the payment that he has
to make when the project is successful, c is the payment to be made when
the project is unsuccessful, and x is the loan-size.8 It will be useful to think
of r as the repayment and c as collateral. The payo⁄ of a typical borrower
is:
p(e)fq(x) ￿ rg ￿ (1 ￿ p(e))c ￿ e
and of a lender is:
p(e)r + (1 ￿ p(e))c ￿ ￿x:
A borrower￿ s outside option is u ￿ 0. This will be determined endogenously
once we permit lenders to compete to serve borrowers.9 Since we have as-
sumed that q(0) = 0, the autarky payo⁄ is 0: We also assume that lenders
must make non-negative pro￿ts.
8As Innes (1990) shows, even if output took multiple values or was continuous, the
optimal contract has a two part debt-like structure as here.
9Observe that we are de￿ning borrower payo⁄s net of any consumption value that he
gets from his wealth which may, for example, be held in the form of housing.
73.1 The First Best
As a benchmark, consider the allocation that will emerge in the absence of
any informational or contractual frictions, i.e. if e⁄ort is contractible, the
borrower has su¢ cient wealth and there are no binding problems of contract
enforceability. In that case the level of e⁄ort and the level of lending will be
chosen to maximize joint surplus.
Consider ￿rst a borrower who is borrowing from a lender with marginal









￿ (￿)) = ￿: (2)
Assumption 1 implies that these are interior solutions. E⁄ort and credit
are complementary inputs in this framework. Therefore, a fall in ￿ or any
parametric shift that raises the marginal product of e⁄ort or capital will raise
the use of both inputs.
The ￿rst-best surplus is denoted by
S
￿ (￿) = p(e
￿ (￿))q(x
￿ (￿)) ￿ e
￿ (￿) ￿ ￿x
￿ (￿) (3)
which is decreasing in ￿. By Assumption 1, so long as ￿ is ￿nite, an interior
solution exists such that S￿ (￿) > 0. Naturally, all borrowers will borrow








which respects his outside option of zero. Notice
that since the borrower￿ s outside option is to go to the other lender, and
therefore, u = S￿ (￿):
3.2 Second Best Contracts
The main case of interest is the second best where contracts are constrained
by information and limited claims to wealth that can serve as collateral. If
e⁄ort is not contractible, then there is an agency problem leading to too little
e⁄ort being supplied. Given the contract (r;c;x) the borrower￿ s choice of
e⁄ort e is the solution to:
max
e p(e)fq(x) ￿ rg ￿ (1 ￿ p(e))c ￿ e:
8The ￿rst-order condition yields the incentive compatibility constraint
(ICC) on e⁄ort by the borrower.
p
0 (e)fq(x) ￿ (r ￿ c)g = 1 (4)
de￿ning e implicitly as e(r;c;x):
E¢ cient contracts between a lender and a borrower now solve the follow-
ing problem:
Maxfr;c;xg￿(r;c;x) = p(e)r + (1 ￿ p(e))c ￿ ￿x: (5)
subject to:
(i) the participation constraint (PC) of the borrower
p(e)fq(x) ￿ rg ￿ (1 ￿ p(e))c ￿ e ￿ u: (6)
(ii) the ICC:
e = e(r;c;x): (7)
(iii) the limited liability constraint (LLC)
[1 ￿ ￿]w ￿ c: (8)
We describe the optimal contract in two parts. First, we consider when the
￿rst best can be achieved (Proposition 1). We then consider what happens
when this is not the case (Proposition 2). It is useful to de￿ne
v ￿ u + (1 ￿ ￿)w: (9)
as the sum of the borrower￿ s outside option and his e⁄ective wealth.
Intuitively, we would expect the ￿rst best to be achievable when the
borrower has su¢ cient e⁄ective wealth to pledge as collateral. To be precise
about this, de￿ne
￿ v (￿) ￿ S
￿ (￿) + ￿x
￿(￿):
as the level of v equal to the ￿rst best surplus plus the cost of credit. Using
this, we have our ￿rst result:10
10The proof of this and all subsequent results is in the Appendix.
9Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then for v ￿ ￿ v (￿) the





r = c = maxfS
￿ (￿) + ￿x
￿(￿) ￿ u;0g:
It is straightforward to check that the condition stated in Proposition 1
that v ￿ ￿ v (￿) is equivalent to (1 ￿ ￿)w ￿ ￿ + ￿x￿ (￿). This says that
the borrower￿ s e⁄ective wealth must be greater than the cost of credit plus
the lender￿ s rent. In this case, it is possible for the borrower to make a
￿xed payment to the lender by a pledging a portion of his wealth against
default. He then becomes a full residual claimant on the returns to e⁄ort,
a requirement for the ￿rst-best e⁄ort level to be chosen by the borrower.
The fact that the wealth threshold includes a payment for rent to the lender
implies that the ￿rst best will be easier to achieve in competitive credit
markets.
Now consider what happens when v < ￿ v (￿): Our result for this case is
given by:
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists v (￿) <
￿ v (￿), such that for v < ￿ v (￿) the optimal contract is as follows:
e =
￿
f(v) v 2 [v (￿); ￿ v (￿)]
f(v (￿)) v < v (￿) where f(￿) is strictly increasing.
x =
￿
g(v;￿) v 2 [v (￿); ￿ v (￿)]
g(v (￿);￿) v < v (￿) where g(￿;￿) is strictly increasing.
r =
￿
￿(v;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)w v 2 [v (￿); ￿ v (￿)]
￿(v (￿);￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)w v < v (￿) > c = (1 ￿ ￿)w;
where ￿(v;￿) = q(g(v;￿)) ￿ 1
p0(f(v)):
Since v < ￿ v (￿), the level of wealth is insu¢ cient to achieve the ￿rst best
￿both e⁄ort and credit granted below their ￿rst best levels. All e⁄ective
wealth is pledged as collateral and the repayment made when the project
is successful exceeds that when it fails. The level of that payment re￿ ects
the standard trade-o⁄ between extracting more rent from the borrower by
raising and r and reducing the borrower￿ s e⁄ort as a consequence.
10Within this second-best, there are two sub-cases. In the ￿rst of these
v 2 [v (￿); ￿ v (￿)]. Over this range both the incentive compatibility and
participation constraints are binding. A higher level of e⁄ective wealth or a
better outside option increase e⁄ort and credit supplied.
For v ￿ v (￿), the participation constraint ceases to bind, i.e. the lender
￿nds it worthwhile to o⁄er the borrower an ￿e¢ ciency utility￿level, analo-
gous to an e¢ ciency wage in the literature on labor markets, i.e. the lender
keeps the borrower at utility level v (￿). This re￿ ects the fact that the lender
does not want the borrower￿ s e⁄ort to fall below a threshold which is de￿ned
precisely in the proof. This case applies when either outside options are
very poor and/or the e⁄ective wealth of borrowers is extremely low. For
example, take the extreme case of u = w = 0: In this case the participation
constraint clearly cannot bind as that would require giving no loans to the
borrower or, setting r = q(x) both of which will yield the lender zero pro￿ts.
In this case, the lender￿ s optimal strategy should be to o⁄er a small-sized
loan, and charging a high interest rate. The borrower will put in low e⁄ort
but the lender will make a large pro￿t from the high interest rate. Also, the
borrower will get a strictly positive payo⁄even though his reservation payo⁄
is zero.
We would expect this situation to apply to extremely poor borrowers
in weakly institutionalized settings, a case where the de Soto e⁄ect logic is
frequently applied. As we shall see below, this is an important case when
considering welfare e⁄ects from improving property rights protection,
3.3 The Constrained Pareto Frontier
We now state useful corollary of the results above which are useful in studying
the implications of the model. First, let
S(v;￿) ￿
￿
S￿ (￿) v ￿ ￿ v (￿)
p(f(v))q(g(v;￿)) ￿ f(v) ￿ ￿g(v;￿) v 2 [v (￿); ￿ v (￿))
be the total surplus of the lender and the borrower with the contract de-
scribed in Propositions 1 and 2. A key property of this function is stated
as:
Corollary 1: Total surplus S(v;￿) is strictly increasing in v for v 2 [v (￿);v (￿)]:
For v ￿ v (￿) it is constant at S(v (￿);￿) and for v ￿ v (￿) it is con-
stant at S￿ (￿): S(v;￿) is everywhere strictly decreasing in ￿:
11The ￿rst part of this says that a higher reservation payo⁄or e⁄ective wealth
increases total surplus while the second part says that surplus is higher when
the cost of funds is lower.
The payo⁄s of the borrower and lender add up to total surplus so that
the constrained Pareto frontier is implicitly de￿ned by:
S(u + (1 ￿ ￿)w;￿) = ￿ + u: (10)
This equation can be solved to yield:
^ u = ^ u(￿;w(1 ￿ ￿);￿): (11)
This is the expected utility of the borrower given a particular value of the
lender￿ s pro￿t and the contract described in Propositions 1 and 2. The
following additional result notes a property of (11) that is useful later when
we study the market equilibrium of the model where borrowers chose which
lender to contract with.
Corollary 2: The borrower￿ s payo⁄ in a optimal contract ^ u(￿;w(1 ￿ ￿);￿)
is strictly decreasing in ￿; and ￿ for v 2 [v (￿);v (￿)]: It is also strictly
increasing in w(1 ￿ ￿) for v 2 [v (￿);v (￿)]:
This says that, all else equal, the lender￿ s payo⁄ is higher when he contracts
with a more e¢ cient lender.
Using this fact, the constrained Pareto-frontier for the contracting prob-
lem and is displayed graphically in Figure 2.11 The 450 line represents the
unconstrained Pareto frontier. In this ￿gure we depict the case where the
borrower has an intermediate level of wealth. For such a borrower, there is
a critical wealth level for above which the ￿rst-best is achievable: On the
other hand, this borrower is not wealthy enough and so if the market is very
uncompetitive, his participation constraint does not bind.
3.4 Market Equilibrium
We now consider how lenders compete to attract borrowers. We suppose
that they do so by posting contractual terms: fe;x;r;cg with borrower￿ s
11In the ￿gure, we draw the surplus function as being concave. It is straightforward




fp00(e)g2 ￿ 0 for all e 2 E, i.e. the degree of
concavity of the function p(e) does not decrease too sharply. This ensures that, in the
second best, the marginal cost of eliciting e⁄ort is increasing in e⁄ort.
12picking the lender that gives them the best level of expected utility. This
market game resembles a model of Bertrand competition. These terms will
be selected from the set of second-best Pareto e¢ cient contracts described
in Propositions 1 and 2. If not, then by deviating the lender can make a
greater pro￿t without the borrower being worse o⁄.
Suppose now that the less e¢ cient lender earns a pro￿t of ~ ￿. Then a
borrower that signs a contract with that lender will earn ^ u(~ ￿;(1 ￿ ￿)w; ￿ ￿).
Then since ^ u
￿
~ ￿;(1 ￿ ￿)w;￿
￿
> ^ u(~ ￿;(1 ￿ ￿)w; ￿ ￿), the more e¢ cient lender
can o⁄er a strictly higher utility level to the borrower and make a pro￿t. The
less e¢ cient lender must then respond by o⁄ering a contract which lowers
his pro￿t below ~ ￿. This logic can be iterated until ~ ￿ = 0 at which point the
less e¢ cient lender cannot improve his contractual terms further to attract a
borrower. Thus the zero pro￿t contract of the less e¢ cient lender provides
the outside option to each borrower against which the more e¢ cient lender
optimizes.
This implies that the borrower￿ s reservation utility will be:
￿ u = ^ u(0;(1 ￿ ￿)w; ￿ ￿):
The contract that is o⁄ered by the e¢ cient lender is then determined by
applying Propositions 1 and 2 where v = ￿ u + (1 ￿ ￿)w. Given ￿ u, the pro￿t
made by the e¢ cient lender is determined from:
￿ = S(￿ u + (1 ￿ ￿)w;￿) ￿ ￿ u ￿ 0:
Given the role of outside options, the way that market competition allo-
cates surplus depends, not surprisingly, on how intense is market competition.
This depends in this model on how close is ￿ ￿ to ￿. If ￿ ￿ ￿￿ is large, then the





. In contrast if ￿ ￿ is close to ￿, then competition
between the market lenders is intense and all of the surplus accrues to the
borrowers with the lenders making close to zero pro￿ts.
3.5 Comparative Statics
The model enables us to make a number of predictions about what hap-
pens as ￿ is lowered thereby increasing the fraction of wealth that can be
collateralized: From the analysis of the optimal contracting problem, it
directly follows that there are two e⁄ects to consider. The ￿rst is due to
13the relaxation of the limited liability constraint. The second comes from
changing the outside option of the borrower. We begin by studying the case
where the outside option of the borrower is binding. For this case, we have:
Proposition 3 (The E¢ ciency E⁄ect) Suppose that the outside option is
binding for borrowers (v ￿ v (￿)). Then holding u constant, the borrower￿ s
utility is unchanged while the payo⁄ of lender is strictly greater. There is an
e¢ ciency improvement from reducing ￿ with more lending (higher x) and an
increase in the borrower￿ s unobserved e⁄ort e.
This mirrors precisely the route for property rights that secure collateral to
a⁄ect the economy emphasized in de Soto (2000). A fall in the transactions
cost ￿ raises the collateral value of a given amount of wealth. This allows
the lenders to o⁄er a more e¢ cient loan by reducing the spread between the
repayment demanded from a successful project and the collateral o⁄ered.
This, in turn, leads to an increase in e⁄ort and, given the complementarity
between x and e, the loan size will rise as as well. Thus expected output
increases too.
If the outside option of the borrower is not binding, we have:
Proposition 4 (The Predatory E⁄ect). Suppose that the outside option
is not binding on the borrower before ￿ is reduced (v < v (￿)). Then the
borrower is strictly worse o⁄ if ￿ falls while the lender gains.
The intuition is for this result is straightforward. When the outside option is
not binding, the lender is o⁄ering the borrower an ￿e¢ ciency utility￿which
exceeds his outside option. Imperfect property rights protect the borrower,
in e⁄ect protecting his wealth. Thus, it increases his e¢ ciency utility. When
property rights to assets are improved, the power of the lender is increased
and he can force the borrower to put up more of his wealth as collateral.
But this makes him worse o⁄.
It is often pointed out that under informal contracting arrangements there
are some accepted norms of subsistence which are sometimes undermined by
the impersonal legal system enforced by the state (see, for example, Bard-
han, 2007). Our model formalizes this e⁄ect and shows why one cannot be
Panglossian about the impact of property rights improvements and there
is a need to examine these e⁄ects in a context where outside options are
determined endogenously.
14In both of these cases, we would expect the bene￿ts of improved legally en-
forced property rights that allow greater use of collateral to accrue to lenders
rather than borrowers. However, this ignores a second (and potentially im-
portant) market equilibrium e⁄ect whereby the set of trading opportunities
are enhanced for borrowers via an improvement in their outside option as
trading with another lender becomes more attractive. This is stated in:
Proposition 5 (The Outside-Option E⁄ect) Suppose that the outside option
is ^ u(0;(1 ￿ ￿)w; ￿ ￿) and hence increases when ￿ is reduced. This will increase
e⁄ort and the loan size and reduce the repayment net of collateral (r ￿ c):
The fact that trading with the less e¢ cient lender is now more desirable
results in the borrower being able to capture more surplus when he trades
with the e¢ cient lender. This changes the contract that he is o⁄ered and
creates more surplus in the lending relationship.
This last result shows that unlike the more equivocal contracting results
in Proposition 4, the outside-option e⁄ect generally bene￿ts borrowers and
increases expected output. To the extent that this kind of market equilib-
rium e⁄ects are observed, the improvement of property rights will tend to
increase e¢ ciency.
4 Social Collateral
The basic model assumes that all trade is in a market where contracts are
enforced using a common legal technology. But an important feature of
economies where property rights to assets are poorly developed is the use of
informal alternatives to the legal system. We will refer to this here as the
use of social collateral ￿the idea that the ability to pledge assets may be
enforced by social networks.12
To operationalize this idea in the context of our model, we suppose that
the collateral value of a borrower￿ s assets is match-speci￿c, i.e. depends on
the lender with whom he trades. We assume that each borrower has access
to an informal lender who belongs, for example, to the same social network
such as an ethnic group or village location.
In particular, let i 2 N denote the network to which each borrower and
j 2 N denote the network to which each lender belongs. Suppose that, if a
12See Besley and Coate (1995), and Mobius and Szeidl (2007).
15borrower in network i borrowers from a lender in network j then (1 ￿ tij)w
is the value of the social collateral that can be pledged. For simplicity, we
assume that:
tii < ￿ and tij = 1 for i 6= j. (12)
This says that members of the same network have access to more e⁄ective
social collateral, while outside of the network, the formal level of enforcement,
￿, is at least as good as trading with any other informal lender.
To focus on the role of social collateral, we imagine that the ability to
collateralize assets in a way that is superior to market trades is the only
potential advantage of informal lending, i.e. informal lenders are subject to
the same moral hazard problem as formal lenders. In this case, the surplus
created in a lender-borrower relationship, whether it is formally or informally
enforced, is given by S (ui + (1 ￿ ￿ij)w;￿) where ￿ij = minf￿;tijg and ui is
the outside option of a borrower in network i.
This set-up now allows us to consider a richer market equilibrium picture
where borrowers can match with either a formal or an informal lender. Sup-
pose that any informal lender can only access high cost funds, i.e. ￿ = ￿ ￿.
In this case, superior social collateral is the only reason why informality
survives. Speci￿cally, trading informally will be viable only if:
S
￿
^ u(0;w(1 ￿ ￿);￿) + (1 ￿ tii)w; ￿ ￿
￿
> ^ u(0;w(1 ￿ ￿);￿): (13)
This implies that tij < ￿ since S (v;￿) is decreasing ￿. Thus, given (12), the
only informal trades that can possibly dominate trading in the market with
an e¢ cient lender will be those between lenders and borrowers in the same
network who have access to better social collateral. Whether this will indeed
be the case depends on the strength of social ties across networks which is
captured by di⁄erent values of tii for i 2 N.
Suppose that there some borrowers for whom (13) holds. Now consider
what happens when ￿ falls in this world. This yields:
Proposition 6 (The Market Depth E⁄ect) A fall in ￿ may lead some bor-
rowers to switch from the informal to formal sector thus increasing the ex-
tent of the market. For borrowers who switch sectors, e⁄ort and loan size
increase.
To see this, observe that switching is desirable only when (13) does not hold
at the new ￿. The informal sector then becomes the outside option for these
16borrowers. However, they get to trade with a lender who has a lower cost
of accessing funds.
This additional feature of the model captures the notion that in the de-
velopment process less and less use is made of social collateral as ￿ falls since
fewer and fewer trades based on social ties will be viable.13 Improvements
in the formal legal system lead to less fragmentation and more anonymous
(arms-length) trade backed by formal collateral enforced by the legal system.
This view of ￿nancial development squares well with Rajan and Zingales
(1998) who point out that a ￿nancial system has two main roles: ￿rst, to
channel resources to the most productive use; and second, to make sure
that an adequate portion of the returns accrue to the ￿nancier. Our model
captures the idea in an arm￿ s length system the ￿nancier is protected by an
explicit contract enforceable in a court of law. Relationship based systems
tend to work when legal transactions are poorly enforced. The precise sense
in which this leads to a misallocation of capital comes out very clearly from
this analysis ￿the marginal product of capital will di⁄er cross-sectionally
according to in ￿ij.14
5 Policy Implications
We now turn to consider the implications of the model for policy aimed at
improving property rights over assets so that they can be used as collateral.
An advantage of having a micro-founded model of contracting with limited
collateral lies in making it transparent how borrowers and lenders gain or
lose from changing ￿.
Much of the discussion of property rights improvement proceeds as if it is
an obvious win-win policy, i.e. is bound to generate a Pareto improvement.
We will explore this issue here and will show that the extent of market
competition is a crucial determinant of the welfare e⁄ects. We will use this
insight to discuss the political economy of reform.
13This mechanism is similar to that invoked in Kumar and Matsusaka (2005).
14This is consistent with a growing body of evidence. For example, Banerjee, Du￿ o and
Munshi (2003) review studies from India which con￿rm this.
175.1 Optimal Policy
In this section, we take the perspective of a social planner choosing whether
or not to improve property rights. We revert to the baseline model where
there are two market lenders each able to capture (1 ￿ ￿) of the borrower￿ s
wealth. To keep things simple, we consider a world where there are two
possible levels of property rights that can be chosen ￿ 2 f0;1g: With ￿ = 0,
there is full registration of titles to property and hence all wealth can be
collateralized. If ￿ = 1, the opposite is true and it is as if the borrower
has no pledgeable wealth. We assume that both values of ￿ can be achieved
costlessly. While this is arti￿cial, it allows us to abstract away from the issue
of how any reform is ￿nanced. The possibility that a costless improvement
in property rights may not be optimal is then a much more striking result.
We will return to the issue of costly reform and how the form of ￿nancing
such improvements may matter.
We consider a policy objective which allows the weight on the welfare of
borrowers and lenders to vary and use ￿ to denote the relative weight on the
welfare of borrowers. We focus on the case where there is a (weak) preference
for borrower welfare, i.e. ￿ ￿ 1. The policy objective is therefore:
(￿ ￿ 1)u + S(u + (1 ￿ ￿)w;￿):
If ￿ = 1, the objective of policy is maximizing total surplus.
To characterize optimal policy, there are two cases to consider depending
on how intense is market competition. Our ￿rst result is:
Proposition 7 For ￿ ￿ close enough to ￿, the optimal policy is ￿ = 0 for all
￿.
The proof of the result shows that with su¢ cient market competition, im-
proving the legal system creates a Pareto improvement in line with our in-
tuitions about policy reforms to improve property rights. The reasoning is
clear. The surplus generated by trading with any lender in the market in-
creases. And with su¢ cient market competition, most of this surplus goes to
borrowers who are therefore strictly better o⁄. The e¢ cient market lender
is also better o⁄ in this case.
We now consider happens when market competition is limited. For this
case we have:
18Proposition 8 For ￿ ￿ far above ￿, the outside option is not binding and for
all ￿ > 1, the optimal policy is to set ￿ = 1.
In this case, the more e¢ cient lender has a large amount of market power
and borrowers receive an e¢ ciency utility. When property rights to assets
improve, the lender is able to demand more wealth as collateral. However,
this is a pure transfer ￿there is no e¢ ciency improvement and total surplus
is unchanged. Thus any welfare function which puts more weight (however
small) on borrower welfare will register a welfare reduction when property
rights improve.
These results emphasize the complementarity between market competi-
tion and market-supporting reforms to improve property rights. In the
absence of competition, it may be optimal to keep property rights under-
developed. Improving them only increases the prospect of exploitation of
borrowers by lenders.
This is, of course, a second-best result. We are taking the distortion
through the absence of competition as given. The fact markets are imperfect
is then responsible for another distortion being optimal. Whether the result
is of practical signi￿cance is moot. But it is a reminder that the welfare
consequences of such reforms are context speci￿c. It may not be enough that
an economy uses markets to allocate resources ￿these have to be su¢ ciently
competitive for reform to make sense. This has been a constant refrain in
lessons from the transition process in Eastern Europe.
The issue highlighted in Proposition 8 arises even if the government has
access to lump-sum taxes and transfers. In that case the government could
maximize social surplus and compensate any losers. However, since surplus
is constant, there is no strict welfare improvement from improving property
rights. Moreover, if there is even a tiny cost of lowering ￿, it would (strictly)
not make sense for the government to do it.
The assumption that property rights improvements are costless is patently
an abstraction. Were this not the case, the costs of reform would also have to
be distributed between lenders, borrowers, and others in the economy. The
result in Proposition 8 is then potentially sensitive to the method of ￿nance
that is used.
In practice, many property registries are funded by user fees that fall on
who registers the asset, which would be the borrower in our model. Whether
these fees are worth paying if they are set to cover the marginal cost of run-
ning a property registration scheme would then depend on how much of the
19gain from registration accrues to the borrower. Imperfect competition that
generates an increase in social surplus (net of costs) may not be su¢ cient to
guarantee that it is optimal for a borrower to register his property. However
as ￿ ￿ ! ￿ all of the surplus will accrue to the borrower and hence he will
choose to register if charged the marginal cost of doing so only when the
surplus created exceeds the cost. Thus, imperfect competition in this case
can serve as an impediment to having borrowers register their property even
when such institutional arrangements exist, unless registration is subsidized.
5.2 Political Economy
One of the striking features of the data presented in Figure is how so many
countries still place signi￿cant impediments to registering property thereby
making it di¢ cult to use them as collateral. Proposition 8 o⁄ers one inter-
pretation of this in terms of the possibility that it is not optimal to improve
property rights when market competition is lacking. However, this would
happen only when the government puts more weight on borrower welfare
compared to that of lenders. One way to think of social weights is aris-
ing in political equilibrium re￿ ecting voting, lobbying and bargaining power
of di⁄erent interests as articulated, for example, in Persson and Tabellini
(2000).
The results in Propositions 7 and 8 motivate the reason why we would
observe di⁄erent arrangements for registering property based on interests of
speci￿c economic groups rather than state competence. Our model predicts
that the economic interests of those who earn rents as lenders (such as large
banks) should unambiguously favor a reform that increases the availability
of collateral. Resistance to reform would, if anything, come from borrowers
who would tend to lose if competition is weak as illustrated in Proposition
8.
Our analysis of social collateral suggests that informal lenders who thrive
on personalized trade and earn a rent from such trade may try to resist
improvements in property rights that enhance market participation. They
would tend to lose from the market depth e⁄ect identi￿ed in Proposition 6.
We would therefore expect this group, if political organized, to lobby against
reforms which allow more universal access to credit markets and extend the
scope of arms-length trade. Thus, poorly developed systems of property
registration may re￿ ect the interests of these traditional elites.
Taken together, this discussion makes clear that we should not expect
20any simple relationship between political institutions and policy reform in
this context. It will depend on complementary factors, such as the extent
of competition in credit markets. It will also depend upon how political
institutions distribute power across the groups who gain and lose.15
6 Concluding Comments
This paper has set up a theoretical framework to explore the consequences of
extending the use of collateral to support trade in credit markets. This has
strong resonance in policy debates and is associated, in particular, with the
views advocated forcefully by Hernando de Soto. The analysis is broadly
supportive of the idea that creating collateral is likely to have bene￿cial
productivity e⁄ects. However, it has emphasized that within reduced form
correlations lie a host of particular mechanisms which, in principle, could be
explored empirically.
The analysis has also emphasized the possibility that when borrowers are
poor and market competition is weak then creating collateral by improving
claims to property need to not have a bene￿cial e⁄ect for borrowers. This
kind of second-best reasoning suggests a potentially important caveat which
does not appear to be widely recognized. Whether this is empirically relevant
remains to be seen. However, the fact that property rights reforms are often
being contemplated in situations of fragmented markets and extreme poverty
certainly gives pause for thought.
15This discussion is related to other recent studies of the political economy of insti-
tutional reform, e.g, Pagano and Volpin (2005), Caselli and Gennaioli (2008), Perotti
and Volpin (2007), Rajan (2007), Biais and Mariotti (2008), and von-Lilienfeld-Toal and
Mookherjee (2008).
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257 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: First of all, we show that if w is high enough then
the ￿rst-best can be achieved. Suppose we set r = c and x = x￿(￿): Then
from the ICC (4) e = e￿(￿) and the lender￿ s pro￿t is r ￿ ￿x￿(￿): From the
borrower￿ s PC (6) we get p(e￿(￿))q(x￿(￿)) ￿ r ￿ e￿(￿) = u and using (3)
this allows us to solve for r = S￿ (￿) + ￿x￿(￿) ￿ u. As r = c by assumption,
so long as S￿ (￿)+￿x￿(￿)￿u ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)w the ￿rst-best allocation is feasible.
It will in fact be chosen by the lender as he gets the ￿rst-best surplus minus
the reservation payo⁄ of the borrower, and he cannot do better than that.￿
Proof of Proposition 2:
As p(e) is strictly concave (Assumption 1(i)), p(e) > ep0(e)) for all e > 0
and so, rearranging terms, p(e)=p0 (e)￿e > 0 for all e > 0: Also, due to strict
concavity of p(e); it follows directly upon di⁄erentiation that p(e)=p0 (e) ￿ e
is strictly increasing for e > 0 (its slope is "(e) > 0 for all e > 0). Therefore,
f(v) is monotonically increasing in v:




It is readily veri￿ed that: dx
de =
￿p0(e)
fp(e)g2f￿q00(x)g > 0: As dx
de > 0; gv = dx
def0(v) >
0:
From the ICC, r = q(x) ￿ 1
p0(e) + (1 ￿ ￿)w: Since at the ￿rst-best q(x) ￿
1
p0(e) = 0 and e < e￿(￿) and x < x￿(￿) it follows directly that ￿(v;￿) >
0: Next we show that for v 2 [0;v (￿)]; under the optimal contract e =
e0 < e￿ (￿);x = x0 < x￿ (￿);r = r0 > c = (1 ￿ ￿)w:Using the ICC and
assuming that (8) binds, so that c = (1 ￿ ￿)w, the optimal contracting











￿ e ￿ v: (15)
26Then, using the incentive compatibility condition (4) we can de￿ne the func-
tion f (v) from:
p(f (v))
p0(f (v))
￿ f (v) = v: (16)
As f(v) is increasing, this shows that the participation constraint will not
bind for low values of v. Given the de￿nition of v (￿) from (21), and as
p(e)
p0(e) ￿e > 0 for all e > 0, it follows that v (￿) > 0: Now let g(v;￿) be de￿ned
by:
p(f(v))q
0(g(v;￿)) ￿ ￿: (17)
be the level of x which equates the marginal product of the input to its
marginal cost, ￿, when the e⁄ort level is determined by (16).
Suppose the lender maximizes his expected pro￿t given by (5) subject
only to the incentive constraint (4) and the collateral constraint (8) holding
with equality. The e⁄ort level and input supply pair (e0;x0) will solve:
p
0(e0 (￿))q(x0 (￿)) = 1 + "(e0 (￿)) (18)
p(e0 (￿))q






is a measure of the degree of concavity of the function p(e):16 It is as if,
compared to the ￿rst best, the marginal cost of e⁄ort is increased by a factor
"(e). This allows us to de￿ne v (￿) formally as the level of v at which:
e0 (￿) = f (v (￿)): (21)
From the ICC, r0 = q(x0) ￿ 1
p0(e0) + (1 ￿ ￿)w: It immediately follows that
e0 < e￿ . Otherwise, if e0 = e￿ from (19), x = x￿ (￿) but this contradicts




+ (1 ￿ ￿)w:
As "(e) > 0 (by Assumption 1), r0 > c: The same result holds for all v 2
16For example, for p(e) = e￿, "(e) = 1￿￿
￿ :
27[0;v (￿)]; given that the PC will not bind in this interval. Hence the result
follows.￿







For v ￿ v; p0 (e￿)q(x￿ (￿)) = 1 and also, f(v) = f(v): Therefore, @S
@v = 0:
For v < v, p0(v)q(g(v;￿)) > 1 and as p(e)=p0 (e) ￿ e is increasing in e,
f0(v) > 0 and so @S
@v > 0: In the case where the participation constraint does
not bind, we have p0(e0)q(x0) = 1+"(e0): Also, di⁄erentiating (16) we obtain
f0(v) = 1
"(e). Therefore, for v ￿ v (￿); @S
@v = 1: To check that S(v;￿) is




0(g(v;￿)) ￿ ￿)g2(v;￿) ￿ g(v;￿) = ￿g(v;￿)
by the envelope theorem. This completes the proof. ￿

























Proof of Proposition 3: This follows directly from the Corollary 1: S(v;￿)
is increasing in v and v is increasing in ￿: Since the outside option of the
producer is unchanged, the supplier receives all the gain in surplus. ￿





￿ (1 ￿ ￿)w
which is clearly decreasing in ￿.￿
Proof of Proposition 5: This follows directly from Proposition 2. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6: This is formally similar to Proposition 5, and
hence the proof follows directly from Proposition 2. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7: Suppose that ￿ = 1. Then for ￿ ￿ close to ￿, the
outside option is given by ^ u(0;0; ￿ ￿): Setting ￿ = 0 will improve the outside
option of borrowers (^ u(0;w; ￿ ￿) > ^ u(0;0; ￿ ￿)) and hence they are better o⁄.






= ^ u(0;(1 ￿ ￿)w; ￿ ￿) ￿ ^ u:
This is equivalent to












￿ S1 (z; ￿ ￿)
which is positive if S12 (z;￿) < 0. This indeed is the case as using the
envelope theorem, we have:
@S
@￿
= ￿g (v;￿) and
@2S
@￿@v
= ￿g1 (v;￿) < 0:
Therefore, @￿ (z)=@z > 0:














= ^ u(0;0; ￿ ￿) ￿ ^ u
00:













￿ S (^ u
00 + w; ￿ ￿)
i.e., ￿0 < ￿00:
Finally, since the PC is binding, by Proposition 1, e and x will go up. ￿
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Figure 1: Property Registration and Financial Development
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